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TURKISH INDUSTRIALISATION: A GEOGRAPHICAL VIEW 
NATIONAL SPACE AND RESOURCES 
Turkey began to introduce modern factory industry early in the nineteenth 
century, but the transformation of the nation's economy has been far from 
complete. This can be demonstrated by SOme simple statistical indicators 
and comparison with Japan, a country which began to industria lise only 
slightly later than Turkey but in similar circumstances and from a com-
parable socio-economic basel By 1970 Turkey's manufacturing industry 
employed about 12 per cent of the active population of 13,519,000 and 
contributed 14 per cent of GOP, but produced few exports 2 By comparison, 
about 27 per cent of Japan's 50,940,000 active population were then 
employed in manufacturing industry. Manufacturing contributed 33 per 
cent of Japan's GOP and produced all of her exports, apart from a small 
amount of raw Silk3 . This paper attempts to outline the geographical 
aspects of Turkey's struggle to industrialise. 
The paper is concerned with the territorial area now occupied by 
the Turkish Republic and chiefly its Asiatic component, but it also 
includes European Turkey which contains the heart of the country's largest 
city and former capital, istanbul. Although centred in the European 
section of the country, the Istanbul conurbation has spread over a 
considerable area on both sides of the Bosporus and its tentacles reach 
out towards the Black Sea in the north and the Gulf of Izmit in the south. 
In the following pages the Asiatic part of Turkey will be called frequently 
by its traditional name, Anatolia (Turkish Anadolu). This is partly to 
avoid confusion when discussing industrialisation under the Ottoman 
Turkish Empire and partly to remain consistent with the sources used to 
provide a regional framework for the later discussion. 
Anatolia has presented formidable barriers4 to national economic 
development by its size and the distances which have to be covered. It 
is a rectangular peninsula around which sea communications have long been 
important, but often neglected by the government. It is more than 1600 kms 
long from its Aegean coast to ~e eastern frontiers, but generally less 
than 800 kms broad between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, distances 
which in 1915 may have taken about 13 and 7 days of continuous motoring to 
traverseS. The area is 755,681 kms 2 . European Turkey Or Thrace (Turkish 
Trakya) is much smaller and covers an area of 24,895 kms 2 , about 3 per 
cent of the total area of the country. Between Anatolia and Thrace lie 
the Straits - the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles. Despite 
well-developed sea communications, they have formed something of an obstacle 
to national integration and regional development, especially since the 
_._-------------_._-._----- -------
o Land under 3000 It. 
o 3000-6000 It. 
~M&~ Over 6000 It. 
.... Chromite 
/:;. Coal 
o Lignite 
• Salt 
• Lead and zinc 
Fig. 1, Turkey' Relief and Minerals Known c.1900 
? 2?OMIs 
6 360Km 
- 2 -
coasts are frequently too steep to allow easy penetration. Dependence 
upon ferry services created a major bottle-neck, both physical and 
economic, at the heart of the istanbul conurbation, but the construction 
of the Bosporus Bridge (opened 1973) should redirect and ease traffic 
flows, thus liberating economic development on the fringes of the 
conurbation and particularly in its Asiatic component. 
Anatolia is framed on the north and south by chains of fold 
mountains which merge in the east to form a tangled knot (Fig. 1). 
Between the great mountain chains is a belt of terrain within which 
movement has been comparatively easy. Its north-western corner is an 
upland mass fringed by plains and extends across the Straits into Thrace. 
To the south liesa series of horets separated by long, wide rift valleys 
which afford communication with the interior, particularly the valleys 
of the Gediz and BUyUk Menderes rivers. Interior Anatolia, the "Grey 
Country"(Turkish ~), consists of high-level plains (up to 1000 m) 
separated by mountain ranges rising up to 4000 m. South-central 
Anatolia is an area of aretic drainage, but most of the region is 
drained by the deeply incised Sakarya and K1z1l1rmak rivers. South of 
the plateau and closed off from easy communication with it by the embrace 
of the Taurus mountains are the large alluvial plains of Antalya, in the 
west, and the 9ukorova in the east. 
The rocks of Anatolia contain a variety of minerals, though for 
the most part they were little known and poorly exploited before the 
1930s. The most important from the point of view of manufacturing 
industry are coal, lignite, oil, iron, chrome, copper, lead and zinc. 
Coal is chiefly found in the Zonguldak area near the Black Sea, though 
smaller deposits occur elsewhere (Fig. 1). Small deposits of lignite 
are widespread, but the main deposits lie in the west of the country. 
Oil was found in the south-east region of the country about 1940, but 
it was little exploited until the 1950s. Several sources of iron ore 
are known, but the most important were not discovered until the inter-
war period, including the valuable magnetite of Divri~i. Non-ferrous 
metals are widespread, but particular concentrations occur in the west 
and south-eastern parts of the country. 
Turkey's climate has been described as transitional between 
classic Mediterranean and Continental types 6 Most regions have a 
winter maximum of precipitation (Fig. 2), but Interior Anatolia has 
3 pronounced spring maximum. Totals are generally low « 300 mm in 
the Konya and Malatya areas), except in the west (600-800 mm) and over 
the mounlwins (800-1000 mm). A long summer drought is characteristic, 
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but its extent and duration vary considerably from year to year with 
considerable direct effects upon crop yields. The interior is bitterly 
cold in winter, with frost and snow, and scorching in summer. Less 
extreme ranges are found around the periphery, chiefly adjacent to the 
coasts. 
Climate and relief have interacted to produce a number of 
agricultural regions (Fig. 3)7. These may be distinguished by the 
combinations in which crops are grown and by the degree of livestock 
rearing (Table 1). Although the patterns recognisable tOday have 
remained broadly the same for several centuries, the intensity of land 
use has varied areally and temporally, whilst the crop mix has changed 
~ver time, especially with the introduction of such exotic crops as 
maize and tobacco (probably in the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries) and, more recently, sugar beet (1920s). 
Forestry and summer grazing have been characteristic of the high 
mountain areas. Everywhere else wheat and barley have predominated, 
probably since the '~eolithic Revolution", but the degree of dominance 
and the intensity of cultivation have varied. Livestock, especially 
sheep and goats, have been reared in most regions, but have predominated 
in the easte~.regions of the country, where nomadic and semi-nomadic 
pastoralism are still found. Temperate fruits (apples, pears) have 
been grown in favoured areas. The major industrial crops ,however, have 
been found around the edges of Anatolia in the Aegean, Black Sea, 
Mediterranean and South-eastern regions. Silk was produced in a number 
of districts in the same regions at the end of the nineteenth century, 
when Turkey was the world's fourth largest producer, but output dropped 
considerably after the First World War. Opium poppies were a speciality 
of the Afyonkarahisar and Amasya districts on the edge of Interior 
Anatolia, whilst flax has been grown near izmit and hemp near izmir and 
Kastamonu. 
These different agricultural products are very often the raw 
materials of industry. Accordingly, their localisation might be 
expected to have affected the type and pattern of industrial development, 
though this has not been entirely the case in Turkey. Four phases of 
industrial development may be distinguished, two of them virtually new 
beginnings. Each has been characterised by different combinations of 
productive factors and marked by particular socio-political circumstances8 
Each had contributed to the evolving spatial pattern apparent in 1970, 
the terminal date for this discussion. 
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PHASE I: THE BEGINNINGS, c.1800-1900 
The industrialisation of Turkey in a modern sense really began during 
the last century of Ottoman rule, though the origins may be traced 
back at least as far as the cloSing decade of the eighteenth century9 
The Turkish Empire may have been the "Sick man of Europe" during the 
nineteenth century, but her vast territories contained valuable minerals 
which could be exploited for the benefit of European and American 
industry and produced a diversity of crops, some of which could be 
transformed in the place of origin either for export or for sale in a 
10 
market estimated at over 20 million people ,even if many of them were 
impoverished. Anatolia, exploited and neglected, was the core of the 
Ottoman Empire (Fig. 4) and contained more than 50 per cent of its 
estimated population. Its more productive agricultural areas were 
fairly accessible from the sea, as were SOme of its more important 
minerals. 
Mining was carried on in a haphazard and sporadic way, largely by 
a number of foreign companies, operating mainly in the western part of 
the country and comparatively near the coast (Fig. 5). Coal mining 
had begun in 1848 and by 1911-12 some 766,392 tonnes were raised, 
chiefly for bunkering and use in the Istanbul area, whilst lignite 
was used locally for raising steam and for heating in the Aegean 
and North-west Transitional regions ll Chromite was mined solely for 
export, mainly between Bursa and KUtahya, and during the period 
1870-1900 Turkey was the world's leading supplier. EmerY,used in 
polishing glass and metal, was also produced chiefly for export in 
the Aegean region. The production of other minerals was much smaller 
and more spatially scattered. 
Handicraft industry was badly affected during the first half of 
the nineteenth century by imports of cheap western goods made possible 
by the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838 since it effectively 
removed most import controls. Output fell and many workshops closed, 
particularly in regions easily accessible from the ports 12 The amazing 
thing, though, is that handicraft industry did survive. About 1000 
workshops were listed in the Turkish Trade Annual for 190013 , and this 
is probably a vast understatement of the true position. Local demand 
for traditional products seems to have remained strong, whilst distance 
and poor communications blunted the competitive edge of imports in the 
interior of the Empire. Cuinet's survey of the Asiatic provinces of 
the Turkish Empire in 1890-95 revealed that textile production was 
widespread in Anatolia and that there were a number of local specialisms, 
some of which entered inter-regional trade. Tanning, leather and 
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metdl working were also widely distributed, whilst charcoal burning 
and the sawing of planks were found in the forest districts of the 
Pontic and Taurus mountains. In addition, various other specialisms 
were found, amongst which the production of small arms and yataghans 
in a prize-winning factory at the military centre of Erzurum is one of 
the mOre Surprising 14 
Power-driven, factory industry was very restricted in its 
distribution at the end of the nineteenth century (Fig. 5). An 
industrial census of 1913 revealed that there were 269 manufacturing 
establishments in the whole Empire using 5 H.P. or more; 76 of these 
processed food and 75 produced textiles 15 Food processing was probably 
the most widespread industry of a modern type in Anatolia, but there 
was a marked concentration in the west, particularly across the Straits 
" from istanbul at Uskudar, as well as around Izmir. The mechanical 
branch of the textile industry was very concentrated, too, and almost 
without exception plants were located in the districts producing raw 
materials. Bursa, in the North-west Transitional region, was the 
centre of the silk industry and its 10-12 reeling mills supplied thread 
for export as well as to the domestic weaving industry in the 
surrounding villages 16 Cotton yarn and cOarse cloth for the local 
market were produced in Izmir, where 15 spinning mills were reported 
in 1890s17 , in the towns along the Buyuk Menderes valley (Ayd~n, 
~azilli, Denizli) and at Adana and Tarsus in the ~ukorova, later 
Turkey's leading cotton producing region. A domestic carpet industry 
was organised around a number of towns in the west. It was dependent 
upon power-produced woollen yarn made partly from local fleeces and 
partly from the fleeces of animals brought from the plateau for 
slaughter. Closely related to the textile industry was the production 
of soap in the olive-growing districts of western Anatolia, with the 
coastal town of Ayvallk as the leading centre. Atthe same time, the 
concentration of mechanised industry in izmir was sufficient to Support 
a number of machine building and repairing establishments 18 . 
Concentration in western Anatolia and Istanbul was very marked 
in the late nineteenth century pattern of industrial activity (Fig. 5). 
Small-scale cotton manufacturing in the ~ukorova, silk producation at 
Samsun and soap-making at Trabzon were the major developments away 
from this region. Concentration owed much to the natural suitability 
of western Anatolia to a range of industrial crops and its comparatively 
dense and wealthy population, whilst Istanbul was the imperial capital 
- 6 -
and the Empire's largest market. Accessibility was also important. 
All routes led to "New Rome", whilst izmir was the focus of natural 
routes in the Aegean region and was linked with major agricultural 
areas by railways which had been constructed in the period after 1856 
(opening of the Izmir to Aydln line). Railways opened up western 
Anatolia as a whole for industrial development in a way which was not 
achieved by the eastern sections of the Anatolian Railwayl9 or of the 
Baghdad Railway20 A well-developed system of sea communications also 
focused on izmir and allowed the easy export of goods in demand from 
Europe (silk thread and carpets, for example), as well as the import 
of coal from the Zonguldak area. In addition, the region itself 
possessed reserves of lignite which were exploited for industrial 
purposes. Finally, izmir was the great centre of western commercial 
activity in Anatolia, and had been so since the seventeenth century, 
when English and Dutch merchants established themselves to tap the 
great inter-regional caravan routes which still terminated there. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, foreigners owned most of 
the mechanised industries, as well as the railway and shipping companies 
and the mines. Indeed, foreign enterprise was of great importance in 
laying the foundations of mechanised industry in Turkey. The 
Capitulations, a series of agreements granting specific privileges 
in the Empire, had been extended in scope so much after the Anglo-
Turkish COmmerical Convention (1838) that foreigners enjoyed almost 
unrestricted freedom of movement and activity, as well as preferential 
tariff rates. Not only did this development facilitate an increase 
in imports, as mentioned above, but it also allowed foreign capital 
to penetrate deeply into the economy. IndustriaL entrepreneurs were 
attracted by the availability of raw materials, low wages, some skilled 
labour (especially in textiles), a potential market of about 10 million 
people in Anatolia alone and savings in transport costs. Their agents 
were often Armenian and Greek Christians, to whom the privileges of the 
Capitulations were extended by western embassies and consulates. The 
new privileged class of Avrupa Tuccari ("Europe Merchants") in turn 
became industrial entrepreneurs in their own right. 
A comparatively small part was played in industrialisation by the 
state during the nineteenth century, though much has been made of it by 
western cOmmentators. Unsuccessful attempts were made to protect industry 
against foreign competition early in the century and government help was 
given to the silk industry in the 1880s21 . Efforts were also made to 
- 7 -
establish new industries, particularly during the reign of Sultan 
Abdulmecit I (1839-61), but most of them failed after a short time. 
The privileges enjoyed by foreigners meant that they could not compete 
with imports, and protection was virtually impossible to provide 
because of Great Power pressures and the dominance of laisser-faire 
economics in the thinking of the period. Skilled manpower and managerial 
ability were scarce, whilst corruption was rife. Bottlenecks, particularly 
in transport, also created difficulties in assembling raw materials and 
supplying finished products 22 Those factories which did survive were 
located near the capital, both in Thrace and Anatolia, and largely 
supplied military equipment for a guaranteed, non-competitive market 
in the shape of the large army which the Great Powers allowed the Sultan 
to maintain. From these modest survivals, the state sector expanded 
considerably during the next phase of industrialisation which began 
after the First World War. 
PHASE II: A NEW START, C.1920-1940 
German intrigue took Turkey into the First World War on the side of the 
Central Powers. "Turkey had already been at war from 1911 to 1913, but 
her involvement in the clash of great powers was a new and shattering 
experience,,23 She emerged from the holocaust at the end of October, 1918 
as, in Mustafa Kemal's words, "a ruined land on the edge of the precipice,,24 
Her economy was ruined, her communications strained and her population 
decimated. Although the people were at first demoralised, the war had 
shaken them from the lethargy of centuries and a new spirit was soon to 
emerge. Allied plans to partition Anatolia, as well as the Empire's 
Arab provinces which they had already seized, met with unexpected 
resistance. A Greek invasion, mounted through izmir in 1919, roused 
Little Mehmet even further. Rallied by Mustafa Kema1, Turkey's remaining 
successful general and a charismatic leader, the Turks stopped the Greek 
advance and finally threw the enemy back into the sea with the reoccupa-
tion of izmir on 9 September, 1922. But the Greeks had devasted the 
countryside as they withdrew, and the effects of the war seemed crippling. 
On the political front, however, the War of Liberation forced the with-
drawal of the Allied forces from south and south-eastern Anato1ia, as 
well as from istanbul, and established Mustafa Kemal's nationalists 
as the effective government of the country with a new capital at Ankara, 
in Anatolia. The immediate tasks of the new government were the 
preservation of political independence and the reconstruction of a war-
torn country. The long-term goals amounted to nothing less than the 
- 8 -
complete transformation of a suppressed and exploited population into 
an independent, western and industrial nation. 
The Kemalists seemed to try to do everything at once, but in effect 
two phases of development may be recognised during the inter-war years. 
The first decade after 1923 was concerned largely with reconstruction 
and laying the legal foundations for subsequent economic advance. The 
second phase began about 1931 and was devoted to state-sponsored 
industrialisation. 
During the 1920s industrialisation was encouraged in various 
ways. A massive educational programme was launched to prepare the 
people to support an industrialisation policy which previously had 
seemed alien to them. A law for "The Encouragement of Industry" was 
passed in 1927 to assist enterprises using machinery of at least 10 
H.P. by granting such things as free land, reduced prices for raw 
materials and equipment, and by making various exemptions. The major 
impact of the law, however, came during the 1930s. In 1924 the I~ 
Bankasl ("Business Bank") was established to provide investment to 
industry. Government intervention around the same time saved the Bursa 
silk industry from the complete destruction which overcame the industry 
in Lebanon with the First World War, and steps were taken to establish 
sugar refining by encouraging the growing of beet and by opening 
factories at Alpullu (in Thrace) and U~ak (in western Anatolia). 
The Republic also began an ambitious programme of improving 
communications, mainly by extending the railway system. The emphasis 
on railways has been criticised, mainly because of high construction 
costs and the low capacity of the single line track, but against this 
it needs to be remembered that, at the time, railways afforded the 
quickest and most efficient means of transport available, especially 
for the movement of troops and bulky raw materials. Some 783 kms of 
track were laid by 1929 and a further 2455 kms were added before 
1939-40, bringing the whole system to a total of 7444 kms compared 
with 4106 kms in 1923. By 1938 most of the system was in public hands. 
The objectives were clear25 One aim was to open up the country, 
particularly its central and eastern regions. This was achieved (Fig. 6), 
though the western parts of the country remained the best served and 
even improved their position with new lines from Ballkesir to Eski~ehir 
and from Afyonkarahisar to Dinar, whilst Eastern Anatolia was little 
more than penetrated. The second objective of the programme was to 
further the exploitation of Turkey's agricultural and mineral resources. 
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Although exports benefitted most from this before the World Depression, 
Turkish manufacturing industry WClS "Iso "ssisted. In the 1930s the 
railways were vitally important to the policy of dispersing industry 
tu the less-developed parts of the country. 
By comparison with the attention given to railways, little state 
effort went into the provision of energy. Nonetheless, coal and lignite 
output increased, distribution became easier and supplies could be 
dispatched to a much wider area than had been possible before the 
First World War. Steam remained the chief source of power, whilst 
electricity generation, which had been banned until 1900 and had made 
little headway before the War, was confined to the main towns. 
The other obstacles to industrialisation were considerable. 
Liquid capital for investment was desperately short, whilst war had 
wrecked much of the fixed capital so laboriously built up under 
Ottoman rule. The population had been reduced by emigration and 
slaughter, many of those lost being Armenian and Greek Christians 
whose skills and investments had been so important in commerce and 
industry at all levels. Rebellion, dissession and nation-building, 
as well as post-war reconstruction, absorbed much time and effort. 
At the same time, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) acted as a brake on 
industrialisation. In particular, it secured the continuance of low 
tariffs favourable to foreign imports until 1929 and retained foreign 
concessions; these were only gradually and expensively bought out26 
It is scarcely surprising in the circumstances that by 1927 
Turkey's industrial structure had advanced very little beyond the 
pre-war position. Although more than 65,000 indust~ial establishments 
were reported in that year, only 8.9 per cent employed more than 5 
workers and only about 0.5 per cent (342) were industrial enterprises 
even within the meaning of "The Law for the Encouragement of 
Industry". Food processing involved about 44 per cent of all concerns 
and textiles about 24 per cent27 Little spatial dispersion had taken 
place and the major industrial concentrations remained in the west, 
especially in izmir and around Istanbul. Change began during the 1930s. 
The government was responsible for much of the industrial develop-
ment during the 1930s, especially for dispersion away from the western 
parts of the country. Designation of Ankara as the new capital 
indirectly stimulated industrial developments under private enterprise 
by providing a relatively wealthy market, a boom in construction and by 
focusing communications. But this approach could be expected to achieve 
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major success only once in the national economic space, and the main 
impetus to industrialisation in Interior Anatolia came from direct 
action in the industrial sector. The new approach developed during 
the 1930s is usually called Etatism (Turkish Devlet~ilik). It was 
never adequately defined, but its aim became clear as the policy was 
implemented - "to initiate and develop projects in fields which were of 
vital concern to the strength and well-being of the nation, and in 
which private capital was incapable, inactive or dilatory,,28 These 
fields were chiefly, but not exclusively, industrial. The Turkish 
leaders decided to embark upon Etatism only partially because of the 
fa~l"re of private enterprise to bring about the industrialisation 
of the economy and develop Interior Anatolia. Other influences were 
important. The ending of tariff restrictions in 1929 gave the 
government the freedom needed to implement a national economic policy, 
whilst an example of effective state action was available in the 
Soviet Union where the First Five Year Plan was launched in 1927, 
a time when Turko-Russian relations were friendly. The effects of 
the World Depression emphasised the lack of industrial development 
in Turkey and her dependence upon the export of primary products. 
Finally, there was the Ottoman imperial legacy, consisting of a 
number of state economic enterprises, On the one hand, and a long 
tradition of state intervention in economic affairs, on the other29 
Investment was structured by two Five Year Plans (1934-39, 
1938-c.1940). The first aimed at establishing consumer industries 
to use local raw materials and substitute for imports, whilst the 
second emphasised producer and capital goods as well as energy 
provision. Both plans were very unsophisticated by modern standards 
and were really little more than "listings of industry, mines and 
infra-structure which the government considered desirable,,30. Only 
state industry was covered. The private sector was catered for by 
continuing previous arrangements, whilst agriculture and its basic 
relationships with industry were almost completely neglected. Funds 
were channelled through two, originally three, development corporations*. 
The Sumer BankasL was established in 1933 with the major responsibility 
of operating the existing state enterprises, as well as planning and 
ultimately running new industrial concerns. The Eti BankasL was 
founded in 1935 to develop mining in co-operation with the Maden Tetkik 
ve Arama Ens ti tusu ("Minera I Research and Deve lopment Ins ti tute ") and 
*The Deniz Bankasi did not operate effectively and its responsibilities 
were taken over by the Ministry of Communications. 
- 11 -
according to a special Five Year Plan launched in 193631 . Capital 
continued to be raised from government monopolies on tobacco, spirits 
and salt, as well as from confiscated evakf (mortmain) property, but 
new sources were also tapped. High taxes were applied internally, 
custom duties were raised, prices were fixed at high levels and loans 
were secured from Britain and the Soviet Union. 
Industrial development was further assisted by the type of 
activity promoted and, to some extent, by a favourable combination 
of socio-economic conditions within the country. Several of the new 
activities had important linkages. For example, the new cement and 
iron works fed the construction industry, much of which was cOncerned 
with building industrial plant and extending the railway system. 
Railways eased the flow of goods and their business benefitted from 
increased production at the mines and in the textile mills. Import 
substitution was a major aim, particularly under the First Plan and 
even in the cotton industry, where Turkey started in the faintly 
ridiculous position of exporting raw cotton but importing much of 
the cotton cloth required by the population. Textile production, 
of course, was well suited to national circumstances, in particular 
the income-elasticity of demand, the availability of raw material and 
great mobility of the products, though the possibilities of large-
scale production and high labour absorption rates were attractive 
to government planners. The use of local agricultural materials by 
industry was an important factor in increasing the cultivated area 
from 4.9 per cent of the total area of Turkey in 1927 to 12.2 per 
cent in 1940, and in raising the real value added in agriculture by 
20 per cent over the decade 1929-39, despite the very severe 
agricultural depression of 1929-3532 Although rural incomes 
increased only slightly, the average population increase of 1.8 per 
cent per annum between 1927 and 1940 in turn helped to expand the 
national market for processed foods, cigarettes and textiles. 
Migration to the new industrial towns, though small scale and often 
seasonal in nature, provided the necessary labour force. 
The consequences of government policy on industry weredramatic, 
both at the national and the regional level. By 1939 the number of 
industrial establishments covered by "The Law for the Encouragement 
of Industry" had risen to 1144. Agriculturally-based industries 
remained of first importance with 468 establishments (40.9 per 
cent of the total) and were followed by textiles with 249 
establishments (21.8 per cent). Sugar refining had expanded by 
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the addition of new factories at Eskiiehir (1933), Turhal (1934) and 
Bursa (1939) in the new beet-growing districts, whilst canning had 
been introduced to Adana, Bursa and Malatya and the production of 
powdered milkto Kars (Fig. 6). Soap making had been extended to the 
~ukorova and made use of oil produced from processing cotton seed, the 
residue from which was turned into cattle cake. Cotton and wool remained 
predominant in the textile industry, but the production of artificial 
silk was started at Gemlik and Bursa, using cellulose produced at Izmit 
from Turkish pulp. New departures were made in the mining, metallurgical, 
chemical and paper industries. Paper was made in 37 establishments, 
chiefly at istanbul and izmir, though a plant was opened also at izmit. 
Mining, which had been stagnant during the 1920s, received substantial 
encouragement. Coal and lignite production was increased to 3,019,000 
tonnes and 229,000 to~srespectively. The valuable magnetite deposit 
was discovered and worked at Divrigi, the chromite of Guleman was 
exploited for the first time and the neglected mines at Ergani and 
Keban were re-opened for copper and lead-zinc production respectively. 
The production of iron and steel was started at Karabuk in the Yenice 
valley, using fuel brought from the Zonguldak coalfield and ore from 
Divrigi. By 1940 the Karabuk plant was supplying most of Turkey's 
demands for rails, bars, girders, plqtes and wire, despite the 
inefficiencies in production created by an uneconomic site33 . 
Armaments factories were established at Ankara and K~r~kkale, 70 kms 
east of the capital, whilst railway repair shops were constructed at 
Eski~ehir and Sivas. Vehicle assembly was started on a small scale 
by Ford near istanbul and aircraft assembly was begun at Kayseri34 
Chemical production was associated with the coking plant at Zonguldak 
and the blast furnaces at Karabuk, but chlorine and caustic soda 
were made at izmit and sulphur was processed at Ke~iborlu, near the 
major natural deposit. One other important development of the 1930s 
was the spread of cement making. Six large plants were constructed, 
three near istanbul and one each at Eski~ehir, Ankara and Sivas. 
A marked feature of industrial development during the 1930s was 
the spread of enterprises to the Central Anatolian and Kayseri-Nigde 
sub-regions of Interior Anatolia (Fig. 6). Single modern plants were 
established near railways on the outskirts of several towns with 
populations at the 1927 censuS of 10,000 or over. Small concentrations 
of industrial activity emerged in major provincial cities such as 
Eski~ehir, Kayseri and Siva, which were important railway nodes, whilst 
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new industrial regions began to emerge along the Gulf of izmit and 
around the ends of the Karabuk-Zonguldak axis. The general effect, 
though, was to disperse industry in a way which was socially and 
politically justifiable, but which was often economically inefficient. 
Some new developments were located near raw material (sugar refining, 
for example) and markets (cement) or where communications were good 
(paper and cellulose at Izmit). Other locations were chosen primarily 
to "seed" socio-economic development, though they were sometimes 
justified on the grounds of national defence. This was particularly 
true of the cotton mills established at Eregli, Kayseri and Malatya 
in Interior Anatolia. Although situated on the railway, the plants 
were distant from the main source of raw material in the ~ukorova and 
located in regions of low population (35-57 persons/km2 in 1935), 
where markets were likely to be comparatively small and labour scarce. 
The location of the iron and steel industry at Karabtik has been 
severely criticised because production was dependent upon fuel located 
100 krns away and upon ore transported for over 900 kms, though the 
original intention was to use ores from the neighbouring camdag35 
The very dispersal of industrial activity created economic 
difficulties. Single, scattered factories required the duplication 
of basic facilities and this was expensive. Complementarity between 
investments was often lost, thus weakening the attractiveness of the 
new locations for other industries. This is the fundamental reason why 
industry remained concentrated in the west, especially at Izmir and 
around istanbul. Necessary improvements to the harbours of these dominant 
cities only served to increase their attractions since they already 
enjoyed a better infrastructure than anywhere else in the country. 
izmir's pull On industry was further strengthened by, On the one hand, 
the reconstruction necessary after the devastating fire of 1923, and, 
on the other hand, by the foundation of an international trade fair. 
Although transference of the capital to Interior Anatolia had looked 
like economic folly in the 1920s 36 , only Ankara could compete with the 
two old ports as an attractive industrial location. As there were few 
resources in the vicinity of Ankara, industry developed during the late 
1930s largely because of the market artifically created by government 
action. The town's increasing and wealthy population provided a valuable 
market for industrial goods, particularly consumer goods, whilst 
developing centrality gave access to the national market, such as it was 
at this period. A vast building programme stimulated the production of 
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construction materials by private firms, though the state took a hand 
by its investments in infrastructure and by establishing cement and 
armaments plants. These developments attracted even mOre people to 
Ankara. Migration thus reinforced the growth of local industries and 
provided the labour for the new factories and workshops, as well as 
for expanding service industries. The pull of Ankara became so great 
after the Second World War that severe strains were put On the urban 
services, while the rise in the number of unemployed and underemployed 
people created by saturation of the labour market, seemed to constitute 
a threat to public order. The slightly later emergence of similar 
trends in Turkey's other large cities created a situation in which the 
government renewed its commitment to industria lise the less-developed 
provinces, a policy which was somewhat in abeyance during the early 
years of Democratic Party rule following free elections in May, 1950. 
PHASE III: ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1950-1960 
Turkey did not become involved in the Second World War until the very 
end. However, full mobilisation, vast defence expenditures .and heavy 
taxation brought a decade of virtual stagnation, particularly in 
industry. The post-war period, especially during the ten years of 
Democratic Party rule from 1950 to 1960, was marked by four changes 
which together had a profound effect on the industrialisation of 
Turkey. These were the encouragement given to private enterprise, 
the availability of large amounts of foreign aid, the relative 
prosperity of agriculture, especially in 1951-53, and a rapid increase 
in population. 
Private enterprise had not been neglected under the Etatist system, 
but its scope had certainly been restricted by the priorities and 
privileges given to the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). The 
post-war years brought considerable criticism of the state sector. 
The SEEs were shown to be inefficient and doubts were cast on their 
effectiveness in raising per capita income, which had remained 
virtually stagnant over the period 1938-50, despite a 25 per cent 
increase in national income. Support grew for a policy which would 
give relatively less attention to the public sector of the economy 
and encourage private enterprise. Advocacy of this line helped the 
Democratic Party to win the elections of May, 1950 and thus become 
responsible for the implementation of new policies37 
Old restrictions on private foreign investment were lifted and 
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American, Swiss, German and Dutch companies began to invest in Turkish 
industry, especially in the production of chemicals, rubber, machinery, 
cement, processed food and petroleum. The main instrument of government 
assistance, though, was the Turkiye S1nai Kalk1nma Bankas1 ("Industrial 
Development Bank of Turkey") established in May, 1950 by 18 banks, 
industrialists and business groups, including the International Bank, 
which had suggested the idea, and the Turkish Central Bank38 . 
Funds from the International Bank were important to Turkish 
investment policies during the 1950s, but American aid, available 
from 1947 onwards, was crucial. American aid began following Turkey's 
plea for assistance from the West when The U.S.S .R.claimed territory 
in the eastern provinces and asked for military bases on the Straits. 
The aid was initially military in character, but the role of purely 
economic assistance soon grew. This sudden availability of funds 
encouraged the reckless spending which was influential eventually in 
bringing about a revolution in 1960. At first, though, capital was 
available On a large scale for investment in industry and infra-
structure. 
One of the first programmes to be launched with American 
technical, as well as financial assistance was massive expansion 
of the road system. A total of 60,623 kms of road were built between 
1948 and 1959, of which 63.5 per cent were all-weather roads. The 
military character of the network is apparent and the parallelism 
with the earlier railway system is striking (Fig. 7), but it did 
serve to open up the interior of Turkey as never before and to integrate 
the national space into more of a single economic system than existed 
before the Second World War. Travel times were reduced drastically, 
whilst the amount of freight and the number of passengers increased 
considerably. Railways continued to work, of course; the system was 
even extended and by 1959 still carried about 60 per cent of the goods 
moved and 30 per cent of the passengers39 Foreign aid also went into 
the improvement of harbours, notably at izmir and iskenderun (initially 
for military purposes), and into increasing electricity production. 
Although a number of new thermal stations were built in the north-west 
and west, where coal and lignite were available, attention was also 
given to the development of Turkey's considerable HEP potential. A 
number of comparatively small HEP stations were built, chiefly in 
connection with flood control and irrigation schemes, but six large 
onAS were also constructed, three of them in the Aegean and North-
wester], Transitional regions but two on the K1z111rmak south-east of 
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Ankara and One in the Cukorova. Power stations in the Aegean, North-
" 
western and Central Anatolian regions were integrated into a grid, 
but elsewhere single power stations continued to supply large towns 
and their innnedia te neighbourhood. 
Electrification was one of the ways of bringing the modern world 
to the Turkish village, which changed rapidly during the 1950s. 
Agriculture appeared to prosper, too. The cultivated area increased 
from 18.7 per cent of the total area of Turkey in 1950 to 29.9 per 
cent in 1960. Expansion was mainly in the cereal-growing regions of 
Interior Anatolia, for there was little change in the ouput of 
industrial crops, despite the extension of irrigation which might have 
40 been expected to encourage such developments It was achieved by 
ploughing up marginal land formerly used as extensive grazing. The 
use of tractors, which increased in number from 17,000 to 42,000 over 
the decade, made this possibly by allowing greater mobility to the 
farmer, but improved credit facilities, high prices and good weather 
in 1951-53 were also important. Changes in agriculture assisted 
industrialisation in several ways. A market economy was further 
developed by the farmer's need for machinery, fuel and fertilisers. 
At the same time, high incomes allowed SOme of the wealthier landlords 
41 
to invest in industry, particularly small-scale food-processing plants 
For the mass of the people improved incomes meant that a wider range 
and a larger quantity of consumer goods came within their reach. 
The rural situation began to deteriorate after 1953. Although 
not the only contributing factor, population increase was very 
influential. Between 1950 and 1960 the total population increased 
by 33 per cent, an amount nearly equivalent to that achieved during 
the whole period 1927-50. The causes were a falling death rate and 
rising birth rate which resulted from the eradication of malaria, 
the spread of preventative medicine, improvements in living standards 
and a reduction in the severity of famine. The net effect was to 
reduce the amount of land available for the support of each rural 
family. Together with unemployment created by the introduction of 
tractors42 , this increased migration to the towns to the level of 
about 30 per cent of the estimated rural natural increase, compared 
with an average of about 10 per cent over the previous 23 years. 
Consequently "rapid urbanisation became a critical factor in Turkish 
deve lopment ,,43 Ankara, istanbul and izmir experienced population 
increases ofl23, 48 and 65 per cent respectively during the decade, 
and these were the largest in the country. Housing was not available 
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to accommodate the influx and the number of gecekondu ("built during 
darkness") is estimated to have increased from about 50,000 in 1955 
to 240,000 in 1960; 70 per cent of these sub-standard dwellings were 
in the three great cities and they housed altogether some 25 per cent 
of the country's entire urban population. The rural influx provoked 
two reactions from the government. First, it tried to keepfue rural 
population in the villages, but the measures adopted, which promoted 
mechanisation and cash cropping, tended to increase migration. Secondly, 
the government tried to relieve pressure on the three leading cities by 
itself providing work in new industrial plants established in provincial 
centre5 44 , though generally these were placed in the already developed 
rather than the less-developed provinces. 
During the 19505 industrial output rose by between 7 and 8 per 
cent per annum. The contribution of industry to GDP rOse from about 
12 per cent in 1950 to 14 per cent a decade later, whilst the 
contribution of manufacturing industry alone doubled. The number of 
enterprises using mOre than 10 HP and/or employing more than 10 workers 
rose to more than 5,000 by the end of the decade45 Growth was greatest 
in the production of building materials (including cement), textiles, 
sugar and fertilisers. 
A striking new development was oil production. Petroleum was 
first found in the Ramandag district in the south-east during 1940, but 
production remained low until the 1950s when it increased from 30,000 
tonnes in 1950 to 373,000 tonnes in 1959 as output was stepped up and 
neighbouring fields came into production (Fig. 8). A refinery was built 
at Batman, near the oil fields, and others were started at izmit and 
Mersin, but were not On stream before the revolution of 1960. 
The number of private industrial firms doubled over the decade, 
1950-60. Their average number of workers was 35, compared with 200 
in the SEEs 46 , and they were kept small by a lack of capital and 
taxation policies. Textiles, food processing and tobacco production 
were the main lines of activity. However, the industrial enterprises 
sponsored by the Industrial Development Bank employed an average of 
70 people and only 30 per cent of them were engaged in the food and 
textile branches. Some diversification was being achieved, since 25 
per cent of the firms assisted by the Industrial Development Bank 
were concerned with vehicle repair and maintenance, about 10 per cent 
produced chemicals and pharmaceuticals and 5 per cent machinery and 
metal goods47 
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Despite the encouragement of private industry, the SEEs not only 
continued to exist but also acquired another 40 factories during the 
decade, especially after 1953. They included the oil refineries and 
a new fertiliser plant, but most of the new plants produced sugar (14), 
textiles (11) and cement (10). The continuation of these almost 
traditional lines became uneconomic, though, since the market was 
already saturated. For example, Turkey becamse self-sufficient in 
sugar by 1950 on the output of just 4 refineries, and yet the state 
started the construction of 14 more, 11 of which were completed by 
1956. High production costs meant that there was little possibility 
of finding a market abroad and the surplus was simply dumped, mainly 
on neighbouring Arab countries. Many of the new enterprises were 
launched without any co-ordination with other aspects of development 
in the economy, and many may be regarded as panic measures. They were 
induced by the failure of the economy to grow as extensively or as 
fast as the government's promises required, by the need for political 
support from the provinces and by the concern to stop the flow of 
rural migrants into Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir by trying to create 
counter-magnets. 
All but 12 of the new SEEs were located outside the Aegean, 
Marmara and North-west Transitional regions in towns with populations 
of 10,000 or more. The pattern was dispersed (Fig. 8), as during the 
1930s, but less clearly related to local resources or markets. Lack 
of co-ordination with other development activities meant that the 
plants were unable to act as foci for industrial concentrations. 
Nonetheless, industry was spread further acrOss Interior Anatolia and 
towards the east of the country, but the most backward regions -
Eastern Anatolia, the Mediterranean coast1ands between }lugla and Mersin 
and much of the Black Sea region - were still neglected. Most industrial 
activity remained concentrated in the west of the country and, to a 
lesser extent, around Ankara. More than 1000 of the private firms 
using at least 10 HP and/or employing 10 or more workers in 1957 were 
situated in Istanbul vi layet ("province"), nearly 500 in izmir, 351 in 
Bursa and 234 in Ankara vilayets48 Seventy-five per cen t of the plants 
sponsored by the Industrial Development Bank were Similarly located in 
the Aegean, Marmara and North-western Transitional regions, as were 30 
per cent of the new SEEs. Other plants sponsored by the Industrial 
Development Bank were more scattered, but with SOme concentration in 
Ankara and Adana. 
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concentration was due to four main advantages enjoyed by the 
already industrialised regions. istanbul and Izmir offered the largest 
and wealthiest markets in the country, and tax receipts from the cities 
indicated that incomes were rising there more rapidly than in the rest 
of the country49 The government's COncern to transform the three 
leading cities stimulated construction, thus expanding the market for 
construction materials of all kinds. The second advantage enjoyed by 
the growth regions was in transport. Istanbul and izmir remained the 
most important ports and were improved. The road building programme 
emphasised their nodality and strengthened that of Ankara, easing the 
flow of goods between them and inwards from the provinces. At the same 
time, the relative ease of mOvement throughout the country reduced the 
need for manufacturers to locate their factories away from the existing 
industrial regions, whilst the relative paucity of transport links 
in the backward regions, as well as their comparative remoteness, both 
physically and perceptually, were positive disincentives to locate 
there. Capital availability was the third advantage possessed by 
the already industrialised regions. Private wealth was concentrated 
in the three main cities, whether this was generated by international 
trade or drained from the land in rents. Ankara, Istanbul and izmir 
remained the main banking centres and entrepreneurs in the provinces 
experienced great difficulty in securing access to capital50 The 
Industrial Development Bank had only One office and this was in 
Istanbul, so that whilst industrialists in the North-western 
Transitional region had fairly ready access, their counterparts in, 
say, Diyarbak1r were 16 hours drive Or 2.5 hours flight away*. Finally, 
the leading industrial regions possessed the advantage of being able to 
offer external economies because so many industries already existed 
there and the necessary infrastructure had already been developed. 
Dispersal of industry in an ad hoc manner and the poor choice of 
locations meant that no other industrial area could fight successfully 
for mOre factories against the established industrial centres. 
PHASE IV: RETURN TO PLANNING, 1960-70 
Extensive, often misallocated investments to develop the regions of 
the country, together with subsidies and deficit financing, caused 
*But the flight is available only once a week, Turk Hava Yollari, 
Yaz Tarifesi, 1973 
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the Turkish economy to overheat during the 1950s. Mounting inflation 
and a serious imbalance On current trading account resulted. Rigid 
government control of the economy was introduced in 1958 to curb i~flation 
and to restore international confidence, but growing economic dislocation 
and increasing social frustration produced a political upheaval which 
culminated in a military coup d'etat on 27 May, 196051 Civilian rule 
was soon restored, but the army continued to 100m in the background as 
the guarantor of democracy and socio-economic justice. 
The revolution produced a return to planned economic develooment. 
Not only was the principle of planning enshrined in the new constitution 
but planning machinery was also set up. The High Planning Council, 
consisting of ministers meeting under the chairmanship of the prime 
minister, was responsible for policy and determining the broad planning 
strategy. The actual preparation and implementation of development 
plans was placed in the hands of experts collected together into the 
State Planning Organisation 52 The first Five Year Plan was launched 
in 1963 and the second in 1968. Both were formulated within the general 
framework of a IS-year development perspective. They were based On a 
macro-economic growth model relating "income levels to gross investment 
with relevant capital-output ratios· 53 and, consequently, were more 
comprehensive than the industrial development plans of the 1930s. 
Nonetheless, the plans were really a set of desirable objectives 
projected On the basis of previous trends and related to each other in 
a consistent way, rather than detailed planning programmes. 
The general aims and achievements of the First Five Year Plan 
are indicated in Table 2. Despite the continuing weakness of 
agriculture, which was partly due to an unrealistic target and 
inadequate investment, the overall rate of economic growth was more 
Or less achieved. Turkey was also able to finance a larger proportion 
of the developments from her own resources than was envisaged originally. 
partly because of a substantial bonus in the form of remittances from 
Turkish workers in western Europe. Funds were available from abroad, 
particularly from OECD and EEC, with which Turkey entered a form of 
association in 196454 . Industry in general fell short of its target, 
though investment was actually higher than planned. This poor 
performance is probably related to the retardive influence of output 
fluctuations in agriculture and the ~ontinued inefficiences of the 
SEEs, but also responsible were the migration of labour abroad and the 
greater than expected growth of services, itself in part a result of 
the employment and wealth generated by the establishment of planning 
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machinery. 
Growth was most rapid in the steel, oil and textile industries. 
To meet rising demand, a new steel mill was started in 1961 at Eregli, 
near Zonguldak (Fig .. 9), by a consortium composed of the Industrial 
Development Bank, the Turkish Iron and Steel Corporation and the Sumer 
and i§ Banks. It was based on local coal, but ore was shipped from 
near Sivas, first by rail to Samsun and then by sea to the production 
site. Costs were thus below those incurred at the old steel centre of 
Karabuk, but production was still not competitive in world terms. 
Eregli specialises in flat-rolled products, whilst Karabuk continues to 
make large constructional steel. Cotton textiles were an obvious target 
for expansion and the rise in output was considerable, achieved mainly 
by increasing the number of private plants and improving production 
in the state factories. Rising demand for oil ensured the continued 
growth of the petroleum industry, particularly when the new refineries 
came into operation at izmit (1961) and Mersin (1962). These became 
centres of petro-chemical industries, as did the latest refinery, at 
izmir (1971). Output of motor vehicles increased by 97 per cent between 
1960 and 1967, with about 30 per cent of the total beingassembled in 
Turkey itself by foreign firms. Economies of scale were lost, however, 
b,· the fragmentation of the industry between 15 enterprises, most of 
which were located in the Aegean, Marmara and North-western Transitional 
regions. 
REGIONAL IMBALANCE 
Despite Turkey's overall progress in industrialisation, the regional-
isation of success is difficult to demonstrate directly over time. 
~umbers of industrial plants or industrial workers in the various 
regions provide only imprecise indicators. Not only have definitions 
changed considerably over the period surveyed in this paper but also 
government agencies have published statistics in very different ways. 
In any case, such figures do not indicate the degree to which socio-
economic patterns in general have been changed. However, some 
indication of the extent to which the Turkish provinces have been 
industrialised and of the spread of industrialisation across space 
and through time may be gained through an examination of two rather 
indirect effects of the process. 
First, provincial variations in development levels in relation 
to public investment for 1967 55 generally reflect the degree of 
industrialisation which had taken place by that date (Fig. 10). High 
~ High development and high investment (Iiras) 
a Low development and low investment (Iiras) 
Fig.10' Development and Public Investment, 1967 
A: Change in the Percentage of the National Urban Population 
in Towns of 10.000 Dr more. 1927-1960 
B Change in the Percentage of the National Urban Population 
in Towns of 50.000 Dr more, 1927-1960 
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Fig.11' Urbani.sation of Turkey, 1927-1960 (see Table 3) 
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development and high investment rates during the 1960s were associated 
largely with the major industrial areas already existing in the west 
and centre of the country as a result of sOme One hundred years of 
attempted industrialisation. The istanbul and izmir areas stood out very 
clearly, but so did an emerging ax~s of development running from Ankara 
through Eski~ehir towards Izmir. The map also emphasises the patchy 
and scattered pattern of high development and high investment areas, 
even in the mOre advanced western parts of the country. High ranks 
elsewhere were both fewer in number and also mOre scattered in space, 
a pattern due largely to the influence of single recent projects. New 
cement works at Trabzon and Van and a superphosphates plant at Samsun 
were responsible for the high rank achieved by their vilayets, as was 
the development of refining and petro-chemicals in the ~ukorova. 
Although a new superphostphates plant was built at Elazlg, the high 
rank of that district can be attributed mainly to investments allocated 
to the Keban Dam, completed in 1973, and of national as well as 
regional importance for further industrialisation 56 
A second indirect measure of industrialisation is provided by 
the urbanisation* of Turkey over the period 1927-60, a process which 
can be examined thanks to work by Kele~ (Table 3; Fig. 11). The 
increase of services and the expansion of communications have been 
important to urban growth in Turkey, as elsewhere in the Middle East, 
but the introduction of industry has been an important catalyst, 
especially in Interior Anatolia. 
The Marmara and Aegean Planning Regions were the most urbanised in 
1927. istanbul and Izmir were the country's major ports and the nodes of 
industrial concentrations which remained strong from Ottoman times and 
were based firmly on access to a variety of raw materials, fuels and 
relatively wealthy markets. Interior AnatOlia was the third most 
urbanised region, but this resulted largely from the build up of 
population in Ankara after it had become the capital of the new republic. 
At this date it was not related to the significant development of 
industry, though new plants were being established in Ankara. The 
Mediterranean region came close behind, mainly because of the concentration 
of towns in the yukorova associated with the development of a cotton. 
textile industry by private enterprise. By contrast, low levels of 
urbanisation were found in the Black Sea region, the South-east and 
Eastern Anatolia. Mechanised industry had scarcely penetrated these 
regions. 
*For purposes of this discussion, a town is a settlement with a population 
of at least 10,000. 
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Urban population increased throughout Turkey in the period after 
1927, and was accompanied by a spread of modern industry. The Marmara 
region retained its predominance as the most urbal1ised regiO!l of tile 
country. It also remained the most important industrial region as the 
already strong agglomerative tendencies asserted themselves and the early 
republican aversion to istanbul diminished. istanbul emerged by 1960 
as the major concentration of leather, paper, electrical equipment and 
metallurgical industries in the countryS7 Despite continued investment 
by both public and private enterprise, the Aegean region lost its place 
as the second most urbanised region to Interior Anatolia by 19S0. There 
was nO absolute decline in degree of urbanisation or industrialisation. 
It was simply that the attempts to develop Interior Anatolia had been 
successful. Although the growth of industrial enterprises in Ankara 
slackened after 1960, until that date the existence of an expanding 
rr.arket made the capital the great industrial success of the period 
1930-60. The period to 1960 was marked also by the emergence of 
Eski~ehir,Kayseri, Konya and then Sivas as industrial cities with 
populations of about 100,000 or more. Industrialisation was spreading 
eastwards. Erzurum became a significant industrial centre and grew to 
a population of about 100,000 by 1960, but elsewhere in Eastern Anatolia 
progress was disappOinting. The Black Sea and South-eastern regions 
were even further behind. 
The most urbanised regions appeareq to be those containing pockets 
of heavy and sustained public investment. Communications and the provision 
of electricity were improved, chiefly in the Marmara, Aegean and Interior 
Anatolia regions. Nineteen of the 21 cities over 50,000 in population 
in 1960 (excluding Ankara, istanbul and izmir) possessed major state 
industries and 15 of them possessed more than one 58 . Only one of these 
cities, Denizli, was in the Aegean region, whilst three (Isparta, 
Klrlkkale and Kuthaya) were situated in Interior Anatolia. One each was 
found in the Black Sea (Karabilk) and Eastern Anatolia (Erzincan) regions, 
indicating the relatively low degree of industrialisation in these 
peripheral regions. Only at Adana, Mersin and Tarsus in the Mediterranean 
region was private enterprise important in the spread of industrialisation 
away fromilie three core areas. Even in the ~ukorova, though, state 
investment in road construction, drainage and irrigation was fundamental 
to the expansion of cotton growing on which growth in the regional 
economy depended. In fact, the lack of private investment in anything 
but cotton growing and the production of cotton textiles is a major 
problem for the region. 
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The situation in the ~ukorova, one of the fastest developing 
regions of Turkey, illustrates the basic weakness of Turkish private 
enterprise. Private capital is generally invested only in activities 
where the turnover is rapid and the profits high. Commerce and 
construction are thus favoured instead of indus~ry, a pattern of 
investment also encouraged by the short-term lending policies of 
most of the banks. State investment is essential, especially for the 
production of capital and even intermediate goods. It seems vital if 
there is to be any industrial development in the peripheral provinces. 
The SEEs receive mOst of the state's investments for these purposes, 
but they also suffer from being the essential tools of industrialisation. 
Theil locations are often uneconomic, and expensive new infrastructure 
has to be provided. They are not competitive and drain state resources. 
Meanwhile, the constant shortage of development capital, despite large-
scale aid from abroad and improved fiscal measures at horne, raises the 
question of whether Turkey is wise to continue a policy of dispersing 
industry in the provinces. Realisation that the concentration of 
investment might be more effective in creating really viable counter-
magnets to Ankara, istanbul and izmir has promoted the designation of 
Eski~ehir, Samsun, Kayseri, Elazlg, Gaziantep and Diyarbaklr as potential 
growth centres. S9 The spread is in favour of the eastern provinces and 
may be seen as a recognition of the basic regional imbalance created as 
much by distance from the advanced parts of the country as by an uneven 
distribution of resources. Turkey is a very large country with a roughly 
rectangular shape and lines of communication are long. Industrial 
activity has been concentrated at one end, and though it has been 
spreading, the eastern regions are still remote from the advancing edge. 
Difficult communications have reinforced relative isolation, whilst 
economic development has been dispersed by the rather scattered pattern 
of available minerals and agricultural land. 
Provided that they are afforded adequate investment, the new growth 
centres will become the cores of further industrialisation. Advance, 
however, may be impeded by uncertainties in Ankara over regional develop-
ment policy. Thus, the First Five Year Plan stated that regional policy 
should aim "to increase overall productivity by priority allocation of 
resources to regions with high social and economic potential". At the 
same time the Plan maintained that regional policy should seek the 
"elimination of regional imbalances and (the) acceleration of the develop-
ment of backward regions,,60 The Second Five Year Plan contains similar 
contradictions. Decisive policy making is clearly called for, whilst 
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reform in the highly centralised administrative system is highly 
desirable to achieve inter-departmental co-operation in formulating 
intergrated and coherent plans for the regions. A departure from 
investment by vertical sectors alone is desirable, too, SO that the 
spatial implications of industrialisation policies, for example, might 
be appreciated. At the same time, industrial development remains so 
firmly based on the agricultural sector that farming needs more serious 
attention from the centre. Not only is agriculture one source of 
industrial capital and the livelihood of the mass of the population, 
but it also supplied the raw materials for food processing and textile 
manufacturing, which remain the country's leading industries. Industry 
is concentrated currently where industrial crops are grown. Fluctuations 
in industrial out-put and in the contribution of industry to the national 
income are in phase with fluctuations in agricultural production. These 
in turn are controlled by inter-annual variations in precipitation6l 
Consequently, failure to invest in agriculture with a view to stabilising 
production, for example, are serious. Not only is industrialisation 
made difficult at the national as well as the regional scale, but also 
the whole economic advance of Turkey is retarded. 
r.lble I: Agricultural Regions of Turkey 
REGION 
INTERIOR 
ANATOLlA 
II 
EASTERN 
ANATOLIA 
III 
BLACK SEA 
Name 
A Central Anatolia 
B Kayseri-Nigde 
C Malatya-Elazlg 
o Erzincan 
E Northern 
Transitional 
F Lake District 
G Afyonkarahisar 
H North-Western 
Transitional 
A Kars-Erzurum 
B Aras Valley 
C Van-Tunceli 
A Rize 
B Giresun-Ordu 
C Samsun 
D Kastamonu-Kocaeli 
E Istranca 
F oUzce-Adapazarl 
SUB-REGION 
Physical Conditions 
-0.2 20.0 360 
Plateau 
0.3 22.7 357 
VO lcanic Soils 
-1.2 26.8 368 
Mts Basins Plateau 
-3.6 23.8 365 
Mountains 
-1.3 20.3 438 
Mountains 
1.7 23.0 615 
Karst 
0.3 22.0 461 
Plateau 
0.2 20.5 552 
Hilly 
-8.6 15.0 476 
Mts Depressions 
-10.1 20.9 546 
Depressions 
-3.4 22.1 383 
Mts Va lleys 
6.9 19.8 2440 
Mts Plains 
7.2 22.7 836 
Mts Plains 
6.9 20.0 731 
Mts Plains 
6.0 19.2 1245 
Mts Basins 
5.5 22.3 735 
Mountains 
6.6 23.1 774 
Basins Plains 
S pecia lities 
Cerea ls 
Livestock 
Cerea ls (rye) 
Fruit Vines 
Cereals 
Fruit Cotton Rice Tobacco 
Cereals 
Vines 
Cereals 
Tobacco Rice Sugar Beet 
Cereals 
Roses 
Cereals 
Poppies Livestock 
Cereals 
Maize Tobacco Vegetables 
Cereals 
Vegetables Livestock 
Vines Cotton Rice 
Cereals 
Li ves tack, 
Maize Tea Citrus 
Tobacco 
Maize Hazelnuts 
Beans Tobacco 
Cereals 
vegetabls Tobacco 
Cereals 
Maize 
Cereals 
Maize 
Cereals Maize Potatoes 
Fruit Sugar Beet Tobacco 
SUB-REGION 
Name Physical conditions S pee ial i tics 
IV 2.0 21.9 609 Cereals Maize Hemp 
INTERIOR Plateaux Basins Sugar Beet Tobacco Vines 
THRACE 
V 5.4 21.6 740 Fruit Vegetables Cereals 
MARMARA Plateaux Basins Tobacco Olives Vines 
VI 8.6 24.8 693 Cereals Tobacco Cotton 
AEGEAN Mountains Valleys Vines Figs Olives 
A Mugla-Mersin 10.0.25.0 1030 , Cereals 
Mountains Plains Cot ton Flax Sesame Citrus 
VII 
B Seyhan-Ceyhan 9.1 25.0 611 Cereals 
(9ukorova) Plains Cotton Early Fruit Ci trus 
MEDITERRANEAN 
C Hatay-Gaziantep 8.0 26.9 1141 Cereals 
Mountains Valleys Vines Olives Pistachios 
VIII 5.027.7 452 Cereals Livestock 
SOUTH-EAST Plateaux Valleys Rice Vegetables Vines 
Fruit 
Key to Physical Conditions 
Jan. mean Temp. (oC), July mean Temp. (oC), Average Annual Precipitation (mm) 
for representative stations. 
Sources: Devlet Meteorolo31 i~teri Genel Murdilrlugu, 
Ortalama ve Ekstrem K1ymetler, Istanbul, 
1962; Erin~, S. and Tun~dilek, N.(1952), 
'The Agricultural Regions of Turkey', 
Geogrl. Rev. 42, 189-203. 
Table 2: Aims and Achievements of the First Five Year Plan, 1963-67 
Selected Aspects 
1. Growth of GNP 
per annum 
2. Gross Capita 1 
Formation per 
annum 
3. Gross Fixed 
Investment as 
% of GNP 
4. Foreign Invest-
ments as % of 
GNP 
5. 7. Growth in 
Agr icu 1 tu re 
per annum 
6. % Growth in 
Industry per 
annum 
Target 
Planned Achieved 
7.0 6.7 
10.7 13.2 
19.0 18.0 
3.5 1.5 
4.2 3.3 
12.3 9.7 
Source: DECO, Economic Surveys, 
Turkey, Paris, 1968, 
Tables 8 and 10. 
Table 3: Urbanisation of Turkey by Regions, 1927-1960 
Towns with Populations of 10,000 Or more Towns with Populations of 50,000 or more 
Adminis tra ti ve % of Regional % of National Urban % of Regional % of National Urban 
Regions Population Population Popu1a tion Popu1a tion 
1927 1950 1960 1927 1950 1960 1927 1950 1960 1927 1950 1960 
Marmara 36.5 37.0 42.5 43.0 35.7 31.3 29.0 28.5 35.0 72.0 50.0 39.5 
Aegean 20.5 24.5 29.5 14.1 13.8 12.5 49.0 10.9 14.9 14.6 11. 0 9.3 
Interior Anato1ia 11. 1 17.2 25.0 15.4 20.7 22.8 21.5 11.8 17.5 7.1 25.6 24.5 
Mediterranean 19.3 21.5 33.0 9.9 11.4 13.7 33.0 9.2 21.7 0 8.7 13.8 
Black Sea 5.7 7.6 12.0 8.1 8.9 9.8 0 1.3 4.1 0 2.7 5.0 
South East 15.0 15.2 16.0 5. 1 4.3 4.0 0 0 8.4 0 0 2.8 
Eastern Anatolia 7.6 8.5 13.0 5.4 5.2 5.9 0 2.2 7.8 0 2.0 5. 1 
National Average 16.4 18.8 25.0 100 100 100 7.7 10.5 16.6 100 100 100 
Source: 
R. Kele~, Turkiyede ~ehirle~me Hareketleri, (1927-1960), Faculty of political Science, Ankara, 1961, (mimeographed) 
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